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Which Variety of Realism?
Some Asseverations on the Dependence of
Abstracta upon Concreta
Frédéric Nef
EHESS
Institut Jean-Nicod (CNRS-EHESS-ENS)
Résumé : La critique du nihilisme par Lowe est soumise à une évaluation. Le
nihilisme semble impliquer un engagement à l’existence d’entités abstraites et
Lowe utilise le principe de dépendance (PD) — les abstraits dépendent des
concrets — pour bloquer la référence à des entités abstraites : les nombres sont
dits dépendre de concrets. On défendra l’idée que cette forme de fictionnalisme
n’est pas innocente et que nous devons sérieusement envisager l’alternative que
constitue le platonisme. On défendra une forme de platonisme, le platonisme
particularisé. En conclusion on proposera de renoncer au PD.
Abstract: Lowe’s criticism of nihilism is discussed. Nihilism seems to involve
a commitment to abstract entities and Lowe used recently the Dependence
Principle (DP ) — abstracta depend upon concreta — in order to block refer-
ence to abstract entities: numbers are said to depend upon concreta. It will
be argued that this form of arithmetical fictionalism is not harmless and that
we have to evaluate the respective coast of the Platonist alternative. I will
defend a form a particularized Platonism. In conclusion it will appear that we
can give up the DP .
Introduction
Could there be a different world from ours? Could there be a reality
with a radically different structure, e.g., without events? Could there be
only abstract things, like numbers? Could there be absolutely nothing?
These questions belong to metaphysics, the core of philosophy; they
systematically relate to each other. To be a realist, or an antirealist,
and to belong to one sort or another inside one of these two persuasions
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asks one to respond to these questions. Realism does not imply a strong
belief in the necessity of our world, as it is, nor a strong disbelief in the
existence of an ontological structure of the world, which we can at least
partly apprehend though perception, language and science.
What is called metaphysical or ontological nihilism1 is always op-
posed to realism. I want nonetheless to defend the view that there exists
a harmless form of nihilism compatible with realism, because in fact
what is bad in nihilism is a strong form of fictionalism asserting that
everything is fictional, viz. all truthmakers are mere fictions and that
therefore everything said or written is in fact pretended, false. J. Lowe
thought that even a moderate form of nihilism (what I call “harmless ni-
hilism”) is a threat to realism and proposes again and again an argument
against it, based on an ontological Principle of Dependence, saying that
there is no abstractum which does not depend upon a concretum.
I will argue that this principle has in fact hidden fictionalist con-
sequences. Usually metaphysicians defending this principle say that to
give it up is to endorse Platonism. I will explore the consequences of
this annulment of the principle and I will argue that Platonism is much
less detrimental than fictionalism concerning mathematical objects, and
therefore that it is reasonable to give up the Dependence Principle (DP ).
In that case one objection could be that endorsing even a moderate form
of Platonism (that there are genuine abstract objects) implies accept-
ing too strong a case for universalism. I will give reasons rather than
sketching out an argument in order to show that the very idea saying
that reality is fundamentally particular is compatible with the form of
Platonism I am ready to endorse.
My final proposal will be then both to particularize Platonism and
to relax possibilism. In many respects I will stand clear off immanent
realism, and probably one of the reasons is the weight I give to the on-
tology of abstract objects, with, at the first rank, mathematical objects
and structures. An important reason, among several others, being that
in the interplay between singularity and regularity, I am more baﬄed
by the first and therefore, ready to make some concessions to univer-
salism in order to explain the deep ontological singularity of everything
constitutive of our world.
The main question in the modal realism debate is about possible
worlds: are they concrete, abstract or empty? Modal realists call them
concrete, ersatzists call them abstract and fictionalists call them empty.
1I shall use only that sense of ‘nihilism’ and never the other sense, forged by
Nietzsche and Dostoievski.
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I will not discuss how fictionalism entails nihilism. I assume this en-
tailment, without explaining it. I propose to give an argument against
nihilism and to show that this argument is also in favor of realism. Be-
fore giving this argument, I have to recall what sense is given to the
concept of nihilism. I will propose a distinction between two types of
nihilism.
Nihilism affirms that there are no concreta. We currently distinguish
three types of entities: concreta, abstracta, ficta. They are defined in
the following manner:
1) x is a concretum iff x is spatiotemporal and x is endowed with a
causal potential.
2) x is an abstractum iff x is non spatiotemporal and is deprived of
causal potential
3) x is a fictum iff x is neither a concretum, nor an abstractum
This categorization is not indexical, whereas the distinction between pos-
sible and actual is indexical. Therefore the distinction between possibilia
and realia is also indexical. Abstracta are neither possibilia, nor realia.
Metaphysical nihilism is therefore defined as:
The set of possible worlds could have contained only abstract ob-
jects. There could have been only abstracta, sets and mathematical
structures.
Ontological nihilism is defined as:
There could have been absolutely nothing, there could have been
no possible world.
In [Lihoreau & Nef 2007] we have discussed ontological nihilism and we
have given an argument against it, saying that it is necessary that there
is something, that it is impossible that there is nothing. This argument
is founded on the impossibility of an empty world. I will reformulate
this argument:
a) the property of self-identity must exist in every possible world.
b) if there is an empty world, its elements must be self-identical (by a)
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d) an empty set is composed of an element non identical to itself, z (by
b,c) i.e. ∅ = {z 6= z}
e) There is no empty possible world (in virtue of b and d)
Statement (c) is based on a principle: if a is an expression like “e is
a set of F ”, then e is a set. For example a set of chairs is a set. It
is somewhat similar to the distinction between pure and impure sets,
between “sets” and “sets of F ”. It is only somewhat similar, because a
pure set is also a set of F , but considered as a set, not as an extension
of the set. This distinction is important, because metaphysical nihilism
is in fact the negation of the existence of impure sets. Statement (e)
cries out for clarification of what is an empty set. As there is no element
non-identical to itself, the empty set does not contain any element.
This argument is problematical in many regards. It is not clear ac-
cepting statement (d) as equivalent to the definition “an empty set is a
set containing no element”. What is not clear is deciding that the empty
set disobeys the self-identity principle. This relative obscurity has led
J. Lowe to introduce a Dependence Argument applied to abstracta and
concreta. Lowe says that if there are abstracta, there are concreta: all
abstracta are founded at least ultimately on concreta. This argument
has been discussed by Rodriguez Pereyra and defended by its author
(cf. Lowe 1998, 2005). This argument is connected to our argument:
the empty set is as a pure set, an abstractum, but it must be a set of
something. Therefore, there cannot be an empty set. Lowe reduces in
fact the empty set to a fiction, when he says that the empty set does not
exist. His dependence argument is reinforced by a foundation principle:
according to him, a set must be founded — there cannot be ad infinitum
set of sets, ad infinitum hierarchy of sets. There must be a foundation
stopping the dependence process. In the same way universals have to be
founded on particulars instantiating them.
Ontological dependence of abstracta relative to concreta is implied
by a principle of instantiation of universals: if there were not instanti-
ated universals, there would exist abstracta, viz. universals, which do
not depend on concreta, viz. particulars. The line of argument is the
following: if the Platonism of universals were true, then the principle
of necessary instantiation of universals, would be not valid and if this
principle were not valid, then there would be no necessary dependence
of abstracta on concreta.
The eventual admission of abstract objects is here perhaps the most
important ontological decision. The choice between immanent realism
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and Platonism is derivative in relation to this eventual admission. To
be or not to be a realist, to be a realist of such or such obedience de-
pends on the conception we have of abstract objects. Abstract objects
are of several types: numbers, and more generally mathematical objects,
properties, propositions. For the moment we can leave aside numbers.
Realists consider properties as abstract objects. Properties are of two
types: universals (or general properties) and tropes (or individual prop-
erties). We know that tropes are abstract particulars. Particularism
possesses the advantage compared to immanent realism of avoiding the
opaque and abstruse mechanism of instantiating abstract objects into
concrete ones. A particularist considers a concretum as a collection of
abstracta, which is much easier to grasp, even if it is perhaps more dif-
ficult to assent.
Two questions now: Is ontological particularism compatible with Pla-
tonism? Does ontological particularism imply a form of fictionalism? I
will defend the view that particularism and Platonism are compatible
and that particularism implies an harmless form of weak fictionalism,
without undermining authentic realism. If I succeed in showing that it
is true, I will be successful in demonstrating that metaphysical nihilism
is not a serious threat against realism.
1 The Elements of the Problem
In a recent paper, “Against metaphysical Nihilism — Again”, Jonathan
Lowe upholds immanentist realism against metaphysical nihilism. He ar-
gues for the universality and necessity of the dependence principle (DP )
saying that abstract objects depend upon concrete ones. He considers
the case of numbers as paradigmatic abstract objects and affirms they
obey to DP . This leads him to the conclusion in that zero and the empty
set are fictions, which in turn implies that numbers do not exist in the
true sense of “exist”.
I do not want to discuss the relevance and the weight of the conces-
sions we are ready to endorse towards fictionalism. This would lead us
probably to wonder if fictionalism, like realism, is modular or not. But,
anyway, I see in that concession towards fictionalism something that
concerns the very reality of numbers, an important piece in the ontology
of quantities. According to Frege and Lowe, numbers are properties of
concepts. Lowe declares himself a Fregean, for he considers numbers as
formal properties, like identity and existence. Zero is a property of the
concept “non identical to itself”. Nothing is non identical to itself and
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therefore the extension of this concept is empty. The empty set is the
set that contains zero members. Zero plays an important role in the
construction of numbers, as the empty set in set theory. For every set
E, E = (E,∅). To consider that zero and the empty set are fictions
could bring back towards a conception of numbers as concrete proper-
ties of collections — “3” is then the property of the concrete collection
of three flowers I have picked. In that conception an empty set is not a
set, because to be a set is to join under a concept a plurality of things. I
will not discuss the problems linked to a fictionalist account of numbers
and sets. I observe only that this concession towards fictionalism lets
me doubt about DP ’s universality and wonder if it is not possible to do
without it.
To keep DP has obviously an epistemic cost: more or less to give
up Fregean conception of numbers. To give up DP ’s universality has a,
ontological cost: to admit in our ontology non-instantiated universals.
However, from an epistemic point of view, Platonist realism towards
numbers is not deprived of several advantages over immanent realism,
as soon as we disregard natural numbers and turn our attention towards
rational and real ones.
In order to argue for a non-universal application ofDP , I shall have to
determine consequences of this qualification. Among the consequences
figures the possibility to be led to accept a world with only abstract
objects, what is commonly dubbed “metaphysical nihilism”. I shall re-
tain the traditional distinction between ontological and metaphysical ni-
hilism, the first one asserting that it is possible that there is nothing, or
that there could have been nothing. I shall make an additional distinc-
tion between weak and strong version of fictionalism and two main forms
of nihilism, in order to be very accurate about the relation connecting
fictionalism and nihilism. Radical fictionalism says that everything is
false, that therefore there is nothing, and as it is obviously a danger for
realism, I will have to decide if Platonism does or does not lead to this
extreme form of fictionalism. We may see some strong analogy between
the aforementioned discussion concerning numbers and the particularly
heated debate between realism and fictionalism in the metaphysics of
modalities. What are possible worlds? Are they either abstract or con-
crete? Do empty possible worlds exist? We call usually modal realists
people saying that possible worlds are concrete and ersatzist or nihilist
those extensionalist philosophers who proclaim that they are in fact ab-
stract. Fictionalists would say they are neither abstract nor concrete.
A brief remark about the opposition between fictionalism and modal
realism: The modal realist interprets typically a sentence like “it is pos-
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sible that p” in the following manner: “in w, p” where w in the operator
“in w” represents a possible world and “in w” as a whole is an existential
quantifier on worlds. Fictionalists interpret this very same utterance, “in
w, p”, in a different manner: w is an expression of fiction, such that “in
w, p” means “according to the fiction w, p”. p is a belief, or a sentence,
not a proposition, because a proposition is an abstract object — it is
a concrete object, either psychological or linguistic. According to the
modal realist this utterance means: “there is at least a possible world,
w, which is concrete and existent, in which it is true that p”, where w
is a world variable, whereas the fictionalist considers “in w” as an oper-
ator moving the truth conditions of p, w having no special sense outside
the expression “in w”, which is an abbreviation for “in a fiction called a
world w”. Moreover, if fictionalism does not imply nihilism, it is com-
pletely contradictory with modal realism, which denies the possibility of
an empty possible world, in so far as David Lewis conceives of possible
worlds as mereological sums.
J. Lowe’s Argument Against Nihilism : the Depen-
dence Principle
J. Lowe’s argument of dependence stipulates that if there are abstracta,
there are concreta too, because abstracta depend upon concreta. This
argument has some connection with the one we have discussed. The
empty set is an abstract entity as far it is a set, but it must be a set of
something, and in that case F = 0. Therefore there cannot be an empty
set — Lowe complains that the empty set is a ‘reified fiction’. Lowe’s
argument implies then both to use DP and to reject the existence of
empty set, reduced to a fictional status. The DP is reinforced by a
principle of foundation. A set must be founded and there cannot be ad
infinitum a set of sets; at a certain point there must be a foundation of
the elements. This implies that a universal must be ultimately founded
upon particulars which are instantiating it.
DP as we have seen implies a principle of necessary instantiation of
universals: if there are non-instantiated universals, there could be ab-
stracta, namely universals that would not depend upon concreta, namely
occurring particulars. Lowe’s argument is then the following: if Platon-
ism of universals is true, then the principle of necessary instantiation
of universals is not valid any more and if this principle is not valid,
then there is not any more a necessary dependence of abstracta upon
concreta because universals are abstract. If there is not this necessary
dependence, then it could be possible that there are only abstract ob-
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jects. In short, according Lowe, Platonism does imply the possibility of
metaphysical nihilism. However the inverse is obviously not true and
therefore Platonism is not equivalent to metaphysical nihilism.
Abstract Objects
There are several sorts of abstract objects: numbers, more generally
mathematical objects and structures, properties (if any), propositions.
Lowe is obliged to assert that numbers do not exist. The Fregean concep-
tion of numbers as abstract objects, that is to say types of properties,
seems to be a rigorous point of departure. Lowe’s position combines
therefore an arithmetical fictionalism and an immanent realism of prop-
erties. He rejects the existence of zero and of the empty set; he con-
siders numbers are different from concrete objects and affirms they do
not exist strictly speaking, for he defines them as formal concepts, not
as objects. According to Lowe arithmetical truths are therefore truths
without truthmakers. Realists usually consider properties and monadic
or non-monadic relations are abstract objects. In general anti-realists re-
duce them to predicates (for difficulties of this reduction, cf. [Nef 2006]).
Properties are of two sorts: universals, or general properties and indi-
vidual properties, possibly tropes or abstract particulars. This phrase,
“abstract particular”, is in fact ambiguous. “A is abstract relatively to
B” means: “A is separated from B by a mental act and A is founded
upon B”. For example a blue sheet of paper exhibits this particular color
as an accident and depending moment. It is an aspect of the sheet of
paper abstracted, separated by the mind, but that in fact depends upon
things and therefore cannot exist without it.
Particularism
Particularism is in some respect superior to immanent realism, in so far
as it does not consider ontological particularity as the product of an in-
stantiation process. This instantiation of abstract universals in concrete
particulars, conceived of as ontologically grounded, is mysterious. The
resemblance relation, even if it is also primitive is less mysterious than
the one of instantiation. From a particularist point of view a concrete
object is a collection of abstract objects. From a realist point of view, I
adopt here, the resemblance relation is founded upon a resemblance of
essences relative to collections of concrete objects.
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Our Argument in Favor of Particularized Platonism
The argument is an argument of compatibility and in that sense it is
not a very strong one. It says that it is not contradictory to admit non-
instantiated universals and abstract particulars if we wish to confute
only ontological nihilism and if we are neutral towards metaphysical
nihilism. It says only that there is nothing concrete, but if we have non-
instantiated universals and abstract particulars, there is nothing concrete
and then the aforementioned compatibility is proved. Particularized
Platonism does not imply radical fictionalism. In that case the universe
is composed with abstract objects, either non-instantiated universals or
abstract particulars. It is non-contradictory to admit non-instantiated
universals and abstract particulars, which do no depend upon concreta.
The conclusion may seem paradoxical, because Platonism in general
implies that there could have been no particular and not only no con-
crete thing. “Particularized Platonism” as we could call it, is a Platonism
reduced to the possibility that there is no spatiotemporal abstractum,
but stipulating at the same time that there are indeed abstract particu-
lars. This Platonism is therefore compatible with the weak metaphysical
nihilism.
Here two problems claim our attention. In the first place is this on-
tological particularism really compatible with Platonism, or this choice
of a particularist option independent with the choice between immanent
realism and Platonism? In the second place does ontological particular-
ism imply a form of fictionalism or contingentism in the sense we have
defined concerning the different types of nihilism? I shall support the
view that Platonism and particularism are in fact compatible and that
particularism implies indeed weak fictionalism. This view, I shall main-
tain is in no way contradictory with genuine realism. If I would be able
to give some convincing reasons to think in that way, I would succeed to
show that moderate metaphysical nihilism is not a threat for the realism.
2 Compatibility Relations between Ontolo-
gies
Let us outline our ontological background. I shall contemplate the com-
patibility relations between these four ontologies, immanent realism,
modal realism, particularized Platonism and nihilism. Modal realism
affirms there are concrete possible worlds, particularized Platonism that
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there are non-instantiated abstract universals and abstract particulars,
nihilism that there could be only abstract objects.
There are first-order abstract objects; i.e., abstract particulars and
concrete objects are composed with abstract particulars. There are also
second-order abstract objects, i.e. resemblance classes of first-order par-
ticulars. The Aristotelian intuition of the basic character of particulars
is thereby confirmed. But these abstract particulars may not constitute
concrete objects and in that case the second-order abstract objects do
not depend upon concrete objects. We have here to stress that the def-
inition of the term “abstract” used for example in the phrase “abstract
particular” is not equivalent to the one given by immanent realism, which
identifies something abstract with something abstracted from a concrete
particular by an intellectual operation of separation. For example the
mass “m” of a body “c” is an abstract particular according to an imma-
nentist realist, becausem is separated from c by the mind. An immanent
realist does not accept the radical particularist thesis that affirms that
m is an ultimate ontological constituent of c. In that case the act of
separation itself is founded upon the very ontological structure of con-
crete particular. In that respect is the Platonist point of view close to
the particularist stance; it does not accept abstract objects which are
not necessarily separated aspects of reality by an empirical process of
abstraction, it has a conception of abstracts hospitable to abstract par-
ticulars, even if Platonism in general admits only universal abstracta.
Objections Against Immanent Realism
This accounts for the non-actualized dispositional properties. These
properties can be actualized in a world different of the actual world.
In that case second-order objects relative to these properties do exist,
but do not depend upon anything in our world. For example it could be
possible that no man is good — in the case of a general corruption of
moral intuition —, but however this dispositional property of goodness
could be actualized in a possible world in which conditions are not sim-
ilar — if the corruption of moral intuition has not taken place, or is not
universal. In that case therefore the Platonist intuition that there exists
a non-instantiated abstract universal is correct. It is also correct if there
does exist a world where there exists only even collections of concrete ob-
jects. Let us figure out a Borges’ world in which reigns the superstition
of oddness and in which are annihilated all individuals whose presence
in a collection means that this collection becomes even. In that world
in which exist only even collections of concrete objects — let us call
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that world an even world — the odd numbers are not depending upon
concrete objects, or classes of concrete objects, but still do exist at least
as sums of even numbers (for example 7 + 3 = 10). It would be still
worse if a world would not contain collections of objects whose cardinal
is identical to prime numbers, as we know the important role of them in
the theory of numbers. Our line of argument is then the following: laws
of arithmetic are necessary and therefore it is contingent that concrete
objects do or do not instantiate such or such sort of property and then
DP is susceptible of being breached, there can be worlds only filled with
abstract objects.
In a world in which all collections are even ones it is possible that
there is an odd number of even collections. There is another range of
perhaps more convincing counter-examples to DP : irrational numbers,
like π, imaginary numbers like
√−1, transfinite numbers as ℵ0. . . Upon
what depends
√−1, π or ℵ0? Upon what depends -1 or 1/3? This kind
of argument goes the opposite way. Large cardinals cannot depend upon
concrete objects or collections of concrete objects: upon which collection
would depend the number ℵ0, the smallest cardinal? To consider num-
bers as fictions is coherent, even more than to consider them as abstract
objects depending upon concrete objects. But this respectable opinion
is nonetheless an important concession towards fictionalism. Numbers
and sets possess strong connections and to fictionalize numbers would
probably entail a fictionalization of sets. Would it be possible then to
assert the existence of depending universals non-equivalent to sets? Or
more precisely: if sets are extensions of universals (for example the set
of green things is the extension of the universal “green”) is it not disturb-
ing to think that these extensions are fictions? Extensions of universals
are sets; would it be possible to preserve then universals from radical
fictionalization?
In Defense of Platonism
The Platonist alternative seems then to be more enticing. The objection
we often addressed to Platonism not to feel concerned by analysis of on-
tological structure of particulars (artifacts, organisms and even persons)
is destroyed if we are able to show that DP is not necessary and anyway
compatible with particularism, if we want to retain it. The question now
becomes: how to conciliate these two affirmations, first that there exists
abstract universal objects and second that concrete objects are composed
of particular abstract objects? This difficulty is as considerable as the
one linked to immanent realism, difficulty we have described a moment
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ago, but it possesses an advantage over immanent realism: to surrender
what is possible to cede and not to give up what is reasonable not to
cede. We accept there could have been only abstract objects and in the
same time we maintain there could not have been absolutely nothing.
The particularized Platonism is incompatible with ontological nihilism,
if we give up the necessarily universal existential dependence of the ab-
stract upon the concrete. However, since ontological nihilism — and not
metaphysical nihilism — is a threat towards realism, in attributing to
what there is an absolute contingency, it is not completely unthinkable
to make the choice of a reformed Platonism.
About Modal Realism
According to Lewis modal realism is the doctrine saying that there can
exist concrete possible worlds. We distinguish commonly genuine modal
realism from actualism. Modal realism says that there are concrete possi-
ble worlds whereas actualism considers only abstract possible worlds, for
example sets of propositions, concepts. . . (Cf. [Divers 2002, 229]). This
cautious formulation of modal realism aims to not exclude a possibility
that possible worlds would be composed of abstract objects. According
to the definition of metaphysical nihilism given above, modal realism is
not a metaphysical nihilism, for the latter says that all possible worlds
are composed with abstracta, even our actual world. In order to trans-
form stricto sensu Lewisian modal realism into a metaphysical nihilism,
we should have to extend in all worlds an eventual composition with
abstracta alone.
Modal realism seems then at first sight compatible with Platonism,
in so far as it does not a priori exclude that abstracta do depend upon
concreta. D. Lewis moreover seems to admit that tropes are genuine ab-
stracta, on the same footing as universals and equivalence classes thereof.
We have defined abstracta as non-spatiotemporal, but the tropes appear
at first sight at least to be spatiotemporal. Apparently the mass of
a body has spatiotemporal coordinates. Socrates’ wisdom is not spa-
tiotemporal, it is in virtue of its moral character, not in virtue of its
particularity. Is it however certain that the man of a body possess spa-
tiotemporal coordinates? A body fills a piece of space-time and this is
because it fills this piece of space-time that he possesses its mass. It is
not only for this reason, but also for that reason, in virtue of the rela-
tions between the mass and the geometry of space-time. But mass as
such is not spatiotemporal: in its definition we have no spatiotemporal
coordinates, even if these coordinates of the body play a role in its de-
termination. The volume of a gas is a function of its pressure, but it
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does not mean that the pressure has a volume. It seems more difficult
to sustain that kind of argument concerning an event trope like Marilyn
Monroe’s smile. However on further consideration shows that spatiotem-
poral determination is not self-evident. Which region, or which field does
this smile fill? From when to when is this smile occurring? A smile is not
comparable to the trajectory of a solid along an axis, or the dilatation
of a metal, caused by heath. It is a singular and complex event, which
is not assignable to a face in a certain occasion, but the mass did not
inherit its spatiotemporal characters from the weighty body, even with-
out, having by it spatiotemporal coordinates. The smile inherits also its
coordinates through the face it is depending upon.
Towards a Compatibilist Ontology: Particularized Pla-
tonism and Modal Realism
The combination of Platonism and particularism that I recommend, for
reasons given above, is perhaps not adverse to modal realism. Modal
realism entails distinct affirmations: there are spatiotemporally discon-
nected worlds (otherwise we would have only a Big World), each possible
world is actual relatively to itself. In order to give a qualified answer to
this question, it is useful to recall D. Lewis’ views about concreta and
abstracta.
Modal realism puts on the same footing our world and possible
worlds. D. Lewis affirms possible worlds are concrete like ours, that
is to say composed with concreta. However, the possible worlds do not
have necessarily the same ontological structure as ours. We may figure
out abstract possible worlds in which there were only no conglomerate of
tropes and therefore no concrete particulars. As the ontology of abstract
particulars is not a fancy, it is conceivable and therefore possible to ad-
mit abstract worlds. If orphaned tropes belong to the equivalence classes
of properties, these classes themselves would be abstract ones and this
world composed only with abstracta would be an abstract world. There
is then apparently a difficulty to characterize Lewisian possible worlds
as concreta, to consider concreteness as an intrinsic property of possible
worlds. It is true that a Lewisian possible world may be a concretum,
but it is not necessary and the difference between actualists and modal
realists cannot be identified with the difference between concrete and
abstract possible worlds.
The ontology of modal realism and the particularized Platonism do
not then conflict. The problematical distinction between abstractness
and concreteness is not a cause of conflict. It is possible that abstract
90 Frédéric Nef
possible worlds exist according to modal realists, as to Platonists. It
seems that modal realism is not strongly committed towards ontolog-
ical DP . The basic ontology of modal realism — tropes, properties,
and universals — is compatible with Platonism. D. Lewis would appar-
ently prefer to shun non-instantiated universals, but he has apparently
no decisive argument against their existence. Like Platonists, he con-
siders properties are abstract beings. The truthful objection against the
bringing together of modal realism and particularized Platonism does
not result from an incompatibility of the two doctrines. It results from
the neutrality of modal realism towards fictionalism, a doctrine deeply
opposed to Platonism, either particularist or not. We are faced to two
forms of fictionalism. The first form is the moderate one. According
to this version concreta are in fact abstracta and then appear to be fic-
tions, for concreteness is purely fictional. The second form is the radical
one. According to this version it is not necessary that there is some-
thing; perhaps there is absolutely nothing. Being or beingness is purely
fictional. Modal realism is incompatible with strong fictionalism: it is
necessary that there are worlds for there is something in our world and
counterpart relations bring about something in other worlds, without to
say anything about aliens. But modal realism is compatible with weak
fictionalism: in a certain way we may affirm concreta are made with
abstracta, if properties are indeed abstract and if the worlds are sets or
collections of properties.
Conclusion
It seems to me that immanentist realism has nothing to gain in the
defense of DP at any cost. If for a similar epistemic cost we would
have a choice between immanent realism and Platonism, it would be
legitimate to choose the first, because the ontological cost is lower.
There is something offensive in fictionalism towards numbers: our in-
tellectual intuition, both epistemic and metaphysical, is choked and it is
not surprising that radical nominalists generally sustain this fictionalism,
as long as they are coherent.
We may conclude there is not from one side a metaphysical re-
spectability consisting to postulate or presuppose the existence of con-
crete particulars, on the basis of which mind would by separation pro-
cesses create abstracta and from another side an ontological extrava-
ganza, admitting beings as contradictory as abstract particulars, non-
instantiated universals or existing possibilia.
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